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THE FIRST GREAT TELECOM DEBATE OF
THE 21ST CENTURY
H. Russell Frisby, Jr.t and David A. Irwinl
"The times they are a-changin' "' And, as we now know in telecommu-
nications, there is no way back.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the ten years since passage of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 ("1996 Act" or the "Act"),2 the telecommunications industry has un-
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dergone changes of epic proportions. Upon its passage, the 1996 Act
unleashed an unbridled wave of exuberance, foretelling industry-wide
changes for the better. But other factors, more so than the Act, have
brought us to a historic inflection point. Technologies, services, content,
and conduits are converging, bringing the public unparalleled choices, but
also raising questions as to the effectiveness of and need for regulation.
The result has framed the issues for the first great telecommunications de-
bate of the Twenty-First Century.
Upon passage of the 1996 Act, Wall Street, the newly competitive tele-
communications industry, and many others widely believed that telecom-
munications would enter an era of expansion and prosperity. After the
initial euphoria, the mood quickly changed as the nation's telecommunica-
tions industry went through market turmoil and economic disruption. Start-
up companies failed, consolidated, or were acquired at bargain prices. Due
in small part to competition and in large part to technological advances, the
legacy companies saw large volumes of traffic shift to new services or
simply disappear; revenues and profits shifted like desert sand in a wind-
4storm.
Most prominent was the spectacle of AT&T, along with MCI and hun-
dreds of other "new" competitive local exchange carriers ("CLECs"), na-
ively waging life and death struggles against the incumbent Regional Bell
Operating Companies ("ILECs," "RBOCs," or "Bells").5 It did not take
long-perhaps it can be measured in heartbeats-until millions of dollars
and other valued resources were gone or otherwise spent in a multitude of
federal and state regulatory, legislative, and legal battles. Some of these
battles were important; others just the ritual "bleeding" of competitors'
financial coffers-an old industry practice.6
On the business side, hundreds of CLECs, along with the jobs necessary
to run them, were created. Over a short time, however, business models
2 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56. This Act was
the most comprehensive of many amendments to the body of federal communications law
known collectively as the Communications Act of 1934, as amended. See 47 U.S.C. §§
151-179 (2000).
3 "There was enormous excitement among everyone, everywhere, in government, in
finance, in technology in telecommunications." JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE ROARING NINETIES:
A NEW HISTORY OF THE WORLD'S MOST PROSPEROUS DECADE 93 (2003).
4 See Paul Starr, The Great Telecom Implosion, THE AMER. PROSPECT, Sept. 8, 2002,
available at http://www.princeton.edu/-starr/articles/articles02/Starr-Telecomlmplosion-9-
02.htm.
5 The Bell Operating Companies are listed in § 153 of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, and include those companies listed therein, their successors, and assigns
that provide wireline telephone exchange service, but not their affiliates unless otherwise
described in that section. 47 U.S.C. § 153(4)(A)-(C).
6 See infra Part II.B,. "Bleeding" can best be described as the practice of large, well-
financed companies tying their less well-off competitors up in regulatory and legal battles
that will drain them of their resources and leave them unable to finance their businesses.
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evolved to meet competitive challenges, and only the strong survived. The
industry introduced bundled services, morphing previously discrete local
and long distance telephone services into "all-distance," flat-rate services
following the rate-structure model of cellular carriers.7 Many of the newly
created CLECs could not keep up with the fast-paced change, and quickly
went out of business-some never even having raised money. Other
CLECs raised billions of dollars from investors, a good portion of which
was lost in these failing ventures; thousands of jobs went by the wayside as
well.
Survivors of the competitive industry are currently facing more daunting
challenges. Regulatory sea-changes have put into place a "new wire" and
"old wire" world dichotomy:9 "old" copper wires are regulated while
"new" fiber-optic, high speed lines are deemed competitive. ' ° Judicial de-
cisions have followed suit, ruling that certain service providers are provid-
ing unregulated "information services," notwithstanding the fact that, from
the consumer's point of view, the legacy and new services are functionally
7 "All-distance" flat-rate service providers are telephone companies that offer unlim-
ited local and long distance telephone service for a single monthly rate. Verizon, for exam-
ple, offers the "Verizon Freedom Essentials," "Freedom," "Freedom Value," and "Freedom
Extra" plans that include unlimited local and long distance service for a flat monthly rate.
See, e.g., Verizon, https://www22.verizon.com/ForYourHome/sas/sas FreedomGrid.aspx?
FlowlD=FreedomGrid (select "District of Columbia" in the drop-down menu) (last visited
Apr. 15, 2007) (depicting the flat-rate all-distance plans available to residences in the Dis-
trict of Columbia).
8 Steven Rosenbush et al., Inside the Telecom Game, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 5, 2002, avail-
able at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_3 1/b3794001.htm.
9 See In re Unbundled Access to Network Elements; Review of the Section 251 Un-
bundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Order on Remand, 20
F.C.C.R. 2533 (Dec. 15, 2004) [hereinafter TRO Remand Order]; In re Appropriate Frame-
work for Broadband Access to the Interet over Wireline Facilities; Universal Service Obli-
gations of Broadband Providers; Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC
Broadband Telecommunications Services; Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell
Operating Company Provision of Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review -
Review of Computer III and ONA Safeguards and Requirements; Conditional Petition of
the Verizon Telephone Companies for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) with Regard
to Broadband Services Provided Via Fiber to the Premises; Petition of the Verizon Tele-
phone Companies for Declaratory Ruling or, Alternatively, for Interim Waiver with Regard
to Broadband Services Provided Via Fiber to the Premises; Consumer Protection in the
Broadband Era, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853
(Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband Order]; In re United Power Line Council's
Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding the Classification of Broadband Over Power Line
Intemet Access Service as an Information Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20
F.C.C.R. 13,281 (Nov. 3, 2006); In re Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Ac-
cess to the Internet Over Wireless Networks, Declaratory Ruling, FCC 07-30, WT Docket No.
07-53 (Mar. 22, 2007).
1o See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 9, 1-7. See also infra Part lI.B.
20071
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
equivalent." In NCTA v. Brand X, the Supreme Court affirmed the Federal
Communications Commission's ("FCC" or "Commission") decision that
the provision of broadband Internet access, or at least Internet access at
speeds faster than dial-up, by cable providers is an unregulated information
service, implying in dictum the same for high-speed access offered by tele-
communications providers. 12 A series of industry-shaking mega-mergers
and acquisitions followed on the heels of these decisions. 3 The result is a
Twenty-First Century national debate over the related issues and questions
regarding the ultimate effect of the tremendous regulatory, technical, and
structural changes rocking the nation's telecommunications industry, as
well as the consequent issues that remain to be resolved by regulators and
policymakers.
The Twenty-First Century debate is an outgrowth of the original "Great
Telecom Debate," which lasted from the passage of the 1996 Telecommu-
nications Act through the Supreme Court's refusal to consider the appeal
of the D.C. Circuit's USTA II decision. 4 In the original Great Debate, leg-
acy carriers and newcomers battled over vague provisions of the 1996 Act
pertaining to the terms of entry into local and long distance markets by
CLECs and RBOCs, 5 as well as the question of how to spur the introduc-
11 See U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC (USTA I), 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004) cert. de-
nied, 125 U.S. 313 (2004); see also Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Servs. (BrandX), 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
12 BrandX, 545 U.S. at 1002.
13 The merger of Sprint and Nextel was approved by the FCC on August 3, 2005. In re
Applications of Nextel Commc'ns, Inc. and Sprint Corp.; For Consent to Transfer Control
of Licenses and Authorizations, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 13,967
(Aug. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Sprint/Nextel Merger Order]. The FCC approved the mergers of
AT&T and SBC, and Verizon and MCI on October 31, 2005. See In re SBC Commc'ns Inc.
and AT&T Corp. Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18,290 (Nov. 17, 2005) [hereinafter AT&T/SBC Merger Order]; In
re Verizon Commc'ns Inc. and MCI, Inc. Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18,433 (Nov. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Verizon
Merger Order]. On March 6, 2006, AT&T and BellSouth announced an agreement to
merge. See Press Release, AT&T and BellSouth to Merge (Mar. 6, 2006) (on file with au-
thor). The merger was approved just over a year later. In re AT&T Inc. and BellSouth Corp.
Application for Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 06-189, WC
Docket No. 06-74 (Dec. 29, 2006) [hereinafterAT&T/BellSouth Merger Order].
14 USTA II, 359 F.3d 554.
15 For a good description of the obligations of incumbent local exchange carriers
("ILECs") to provide unbundled network elements to CLECs, see In re Review of Section
251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers; Implementation of the
Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Deployment of
Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Report and Order
and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 16,978 1
8-14 (Aug. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Triennial Review Remand Order], vacated and remanded
in part, aff'd in part, USTA II, 359 F.3d 554. Likewise, with regard to RBOC entry into
long distance markets, see, e.g., In re Application by SBC Communications Inc., South-
western Bell Telephone Company, and South Western Bell Communications Services, Inc.
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tion of advanced services like broadband throughout the country. 6 The
first debate ended with the FCC's simultaneous approval of the mergers of
legacy carrier AT&T with SBC, the resulting company to be called the
"new" AT&T, 17 and Verizon with MCI. I" The consolidation continues as
BellSouth is merged into the "new" AT&9T. 1'
The new debate is attributable to the fact that in the framework of tele-
communications, as in many other contexts, it cannot be doubted that the
Internet changes everything.2" At the heart of the new debate is the un-
equivocal fact that, due in large part to the Internet, today's telecommuni-
cations world is not what was envisioned when President Clinton signed
the 1996 Act. Remarkably, the term "Internet" only appears twice among
the nearly 750,000 words of the Act. Faced with the Internet and the con-
vergence of technologies and services, the new debate arises out of the
concern that the Act is ineffective in the digital age.
Academics and industry pundits worry that intra-modal competition2' is
shrinking; they fear a return to the days of telephone company monopolies
and high, value-of-service-based consumer rates. To them, increased regu-
lation appears to be the solution in the digital age.2 Others, concerned
about the speed and ubiquity of true nationwide broadband deployment,
d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long Distance; Pursuant to Servtion 271 of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 to Provide In-Region InterLATA Services in Texas, Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 18,354 (June 31, 2000).
16 Section 706 of the 1996 Act provides that "[t]he Commission ... shall encourage the
deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to
all Americans .. " Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 706, 110
Stat. 56, 153 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 157 (2000)).
17 See AT&T/SBC Merger Order, supra note 13. See also infra Part II.A.
18 See Verizon Merger Order, supra note 13, 4.
19 See AT&T/BellSouth Merger Order, supra note 13.
20 The "Internet changes everything" has become a popular term of art describing the
potential of the Internet to affect our lives in countless ways. Aside from the obvious in-
crease in the availability of information, the Internet has changed the telecommunications
landscape by allowing competition across delivery platforms that was not possible before its
invention. See infra Part II.C.
21 The FCC defines "intramodal competitors" as those whose services are either deliv-
ered partially or wholly over ILEC facilities, or over wireline platforms using technology
identical or similar to those which ILECs have deployed. Wireline Broadband Order, supra
note 9, 3 n.7. It defines "intermodal competitors" as providers of services similar to those
provided by ILECs that rely exclusively on technological platforms other than wireline
technologies. Id. This definition is incorrect because even wireless and cable providers rely
on ILECs for wholesale services.
22 See, e.g., ACTel Charges Wireline Mergers Will Cause Grave Competitive Harms,
COMM. DAILY, June 15, 2005; see also In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of
Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations from AT&T Corp., Transferor to SBC
Commc'ns Inc., Transferee, Joint Opposition of SBC Commc "ns and AT&T Corp. to Peti-
tions to Deny and Reply Comments, WC Docket No. 05-65, at i (May 10, 2005) (accessible
via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System).
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seek freedom from regulation along with revisionist changes in policy to
spur competition and innovation in telecommunications.23
While both the pro- and anti-regulation camps may have some merit,
perhaps it is prudent to pursue a middle ground: deregulation where com-
petition exists and the ability to regulate where market forces fail. This is
nothing new, as it is the policy under the 1996 Act to do just that. In the
converging telecommunications environment, however, the latter of these
choices poses a jurisdictional problem for the FCC that may prove to stifle
competition and innovation.
The FCC's jurisdiction to regulate information services under Title I of
the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, currently rests on uncertain
ground.24 This article argues that the first and most important step toward
providing the public with a speedy resolution of the new debate is for Con-
gress to affirm by statute the authority that the FCC has asserted over in-
formation services under Title 1.25 This proposal represents a major change
in the nation's regulatory philosophy, but it is one that is justified in the
new telecommunications environment.
This article is an attempt to portray historically what happened in the
wake of the passage of the 1996 Act, why it happened, and to forecast, as
best as one can, from a legislative and regulatory standpoint, how to en-
courage continued innovation while preserving the FCC's ability to ad-
dress market failure and consumer protection issues as they arise. Part II
below describes how regulatory changes, along with technological innova-
tions, have led us to a telecommunications environment in which the
FCC's authority to regulate broadband services is in doubt. Part II.A de-
scribes the regulatory about-face taken by the Commission, from encourag-
ing same-platform competition in the common carrier area, to making in-
tramodal competition economically unfeasible for CLECs and instead en-
couraging facilities-based competition across platforms.
In Part II.B, this article describes the actions taken by the Commission to
level the playing field across platforms while following the intermodal
competition model in the area of broadband regulation. In doing so, the
Commission has defined itself into a comer and placed its jurisdiction to
regulate broadband services into question. Section II.C discusses the con-
vergence of technologies and its effect on regulation. This section de-
23 See, e.g., Randolph J. May, et al., Digital Age Communications Act (Progress &
Freedom Found., Proposal of the Regulatory Framework Working Group, rel. 1.0, 2005),
htt://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/other/050617regframework.pdf.
4 See, e.g., Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serv's. (Brand A),
545 U.S. 967, 1005 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (pointing to the uncertain ground upon
which the FCC's jurisdiction to regulate information services lies).
25 See id. at 976. ("Information-service providers, by contrast, are not subject to manda-
tory common-carrier regulation under Title II, though the Commission has jurisdiction to
impose additional regulatory obligations under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction to regulate
interstate and foreign communications .... (citing 47 U.S.C. § § 151-161)).
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scribes how deregulation and broadband deployment have enabled, among
other things, cable companies to enter the voice services market, voice
companies to enter the video market, and wireless companies to enter the
broadband market. The result of convergence of this magnitude is to make
moot the distinct silos of today's regulatory environment.26
While the current scheme of regulation may be irrelevant, this does not
mean that regulation is no longer necessary. Section II.D below describes
why the FCC's ability to regulate must be affirmed by statute. The rapid
development of technology and the tendency of telecommunications com-
panies to seek economies of scale through consolidation and merger re-
quire the presence of an empowered regulator. An empowered regulator is
also necessary to ensure certainty and foster innovation. The FCC's author-
ity to regulate information services must therefore be confirmed by Con-
gress, ensuring that it can step in to act in the name of competition and
consumer protection where the market fails.
II. THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GREAT DEBATE: A
CHRONOLOGY, AN EXPLANATION, AND A PROPOSAL
What happened after 1996 to cause all of the predictions to miss the
mark? In actuality, many things happened. What took place can best be
described as a regulatory, economic, and technological tsunami. Changes
in policy and technology have made competition possible where it was not
possible before. Entities providing similar services over different telecom-
munications platforms appear to thrive even while intramodal competition
has become significantly impaired.27
Without doubt, this is not the world envisioned in 1996 by Congress and
the President. 2' There will, however, be no return to the past-no return to
a monopolistic world of "doom and gloom." So many dramatic market-
place changes and technological innovations have taken place since 1996
26 See Adam Thierer, Are "Dumb Pipe" Mandates Smart Public Policy? Vertical Inte-
gration, Net Neutrality, and the Network Layers Model, 3 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
275, 280 (2005) ("The traditional vertical 'silo' model of communications industry regula-
tion views each industry sector as a distinct set of entities that do not interact and which
should be regulated under different principles.").
27 See In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliations
Act of 1993; Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect
to Commercial Mobile Services, Eleventh Report, 21 F.C.C.R. 10,947, 5, 29, 30-31, 34,
204-212 (Sept. 26, 2006) [hereinafter Eleventh Annual CMRS Competition Report] avail-
able at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-06-142A1.pdf (discussing
wireless services that include voice, video, broadband, and data in competition with wire-
line providers of the same services). See also infra Part II.A (discussing the demise of regu-
latory requirements that supported intramodal competition).
28 CHARLES B. GOLDFARB, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT:
COMPETITION INNOVATION AND REFORM, 11-15 (discussing the legislative history and the
Administration's involvement in crafting the Act).
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that developments today have taken on the air of inevitability. Like
Humpty Dumpty, the historic voice-oriented Bell system has fallen, and
cannot be put back together again.
Convergence has given rise to increased intermodal competition, ena-
bling Bell companies to expand their service offerings. Bell and other local
phone companies are providing video and high-speed Internet access,
along with voice.29 Simultaneously, telephone companies face serious new
competition from cable, wireless, satellite, and Internet companies, which
are offering the same services.3° Industry convergence is now a fact of life.
In this new environment of fast-paced change, policymakers face the
quadruple challenges of: (1) promoting colnpetition;31 (2) protecting con-
sumers;32 (3) avoiding the regulatory uncertainty that paralyzed the indus-
try in the past;" and (4) recognizing that developments in Voice over
Internet Protocol service ("VolP"), 34  Internet Protocol Television
("IPTV"), 35 and broadband technology in general mandate that this na-
tion's telecommunications regulatory foundation and scheme change. 6
This is not an inconsequential task-this is huge! There are no easy or
completely satisfying solutions. Moreover, continuing technological inno-
vations serve to preclude reliance on traditional regulatory fixes. 37 Broad-
band deregulation, particularly at the retail level, appears inevitable.
29 See In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for Delivery
of Video, Twelfth Annual Report, 21 F.C.C.R. 2503, 121 (Feb. 10, 2006) [hereinafter
Twelfth Annual Cable Report].
30 See id. 50, 89.
3l 47 U.S.C. § 257 (2000).
32 § 254(i).
33 See Randolph J. May, et al., supra note 23, at 5-7.
34 The FCC uses the term "Vol?" generally to include any IP-enabled service "offering
real-time, multidirectional voice functionality, including but not limited to, services that
mimic traditional telephony." In re Vonage Holdings Corporation Petition for Declaratory
Ruling Concerning an Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 22,404, 4 n.9 (Nov. 9, 2004) [hereinafter Vonage Order].
35 "IPTV," or Internet Protocol Television, is described by the FCC as a means for
traditional LECs to provide "further distribution of multichannel video services" over
broadband connections. Twelfth Annual Cable Report, supra note 29, 122-23.
36 John Borland, Why Policies Must Change, CNET NEWS.COM, July 27, 2004,
http://news.com.com/2009-1034 3-5261375.html.
7 The FCC's recent VolP E911 Order may prove to be a prime example of the manner
in which technology can simultaneously create opportunities, such as the ability to commu-
nicate from anywhere in the world using one phone number, as well as problems which
cannot be easily addressed by traditional regulatory methods, like the determination of a
nomadic user's location for the purpose of sending emergency response. See In re IP-
Enabled Services; E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Service Providers, First Report and
Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 10,245, 4 (May 19, 2005) [here-
inafter VolP E911 Order].
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Policymakers are already confronting issues pertaining to local authority
to regulate cable television franchising and access to IPTV by others. 38
Policymakers must now consider whether the time has come move toward
deregulation of all voice services, regardless of transmission mechanism. If
so, they must consider what regulatory authority, if any, should be retained
on the federal, state, or local levels. And finally, in what circumstances
should the retained authority be exercised?
A. Post-1996 Regulatory Changes
Perhaps the most significant change affecting the telecommunications
industry in recent years has been the stark about-face in FCC competition
policy. In the past, regulators, policymakers, and CLECs strongly sup-
ported non-facilities-based intramodal competition as both a CLEC entry
vehicle and a means by which to ensure that residential customers bene-
fited from competitive services. 39 This was accomplished from a regulatory
perspective by requiring incumbent carriers to make their network ele-
ments available for lease by competitors on an unbundled basis. 40 For car-
riers like AT&T, who once provided only long distance service, this was
the only practical way to reach a nationwide base of residential and small
and medium business ("SMB") customers.41
Federal policy shifted away from making unbundled network elements
and platforms available to competitors;42 now, non-facilities based compe-
tition has, for all practical purposes, been made impossible or uneco-
nomic-indeed, it is disappearing. 43 The primary victims of this policy
turnaround were legacy AT&T and MCI, which early-on had focused on
local service along with long distance.4 As a consequence, AT&T initially
38 See Triennial Review Remand Order, supra note 15, 3-4. See also In re Implemen-
tation of Section 621(a)(1) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 as amended by
the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Report and Order
andFurther Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 06-180, MB Docket No. 05-311 (Dec. 20,
2006) [hereinafter Franchising Order] (preempting local franchising authority ability to un-
reasonably refuse to grant a competitive video franchise).
39 See In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996; Interconnection between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial
Mobile Radio Service Providers, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, 1 1 (Aug. 1,
1996) [hereinafter Local Competition Order]. See also MARTIN F. MCDERMOTr III, CLEC:
AN INSIDER'S LOOK AT THE RISE AND FALL OF LOCAL EXCHANGE COMPETITION 175 (Penob-
scot Press 2002).
40 Triennial Review Remand Order, supra note 15, T 3.
41 See id. 1 4-6. See also Local Competition Order, supra note 39, 10.
42 Local Competition Order, supra note 39, $$ 3-4.
43 See, e.g., Triennial Review Remand Order, supra note 15, 3-4.
44 See Robert W. Crandall & Leonard Waverman, The Failure of Competitive Entry Into
Fixed-Line Telecommunications: Who Is at Fault?, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 113
(2006); Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the Man-
datory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE L.J. 417 (1999-2000);
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withdrew from the residential and SMB markets, while MCI attempted to
manage the decline of its mass-market base.45 Ultimately, both of these
companies-one having just emerged from bankruptcy and the other about
to fall into that black hole-agreed to mergers that once were described as
"unthinkable."46 Ultimately, these mergers were described as encouraging
by regulators who were desperately attempting to preserve the benefits of
competition for consumers. 47 Not unexpectedly, though somewhat ironi-
cally, the AT&T name survived the merger into SBC 48 and the internation-
ally recognized brand AT&T will continue upon the merger with Bell-
South.49 This result was not what most parties foresaw in 1996.
The 1996 Telecommunications Act set forth three primary goals: (1) to
open the local markets to competition; (2) to open the long distance mar-
kets to the RBOCs; and (3) to promote the introduction of advanced ser-
vices throughout the country.5° The FCC's task under the 1996 Act was
Brian L. Roberts, The Greatest Story Never Told: How the 1996 Telecommunications Act
,rpedto Transform Cable's Future, 58 FED. COMM. LJ. 571 (2006).
Hel~pdornjr
4s See Nicholas Economides, Telecommunications Regulation: An Introduction, 813
PLU/PAT 452 (2004); Mark D. Schnieder & Marc D. Goldman, The USTA Decisions and
the Rise and Fall of Telephone Competition, 22 COMM. LAW. 1 (2004); Shawn Young,
AT&T Posts 80% Drop in Net, Confirms Consumer Retreat, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2004, at
A11; George Mannes & Scott Moritz, MCI Plans Major Retrenchment, THE STREET.COM,
June 25, 2004, http://www.thestreet.com/tech/telecom/10168007.html; Press Release,
AT&T News Room, AT&T Announces Second-Quarter 2004 Earnings, Company to Stop
Investing in Traditional Consumer Services; Concentrate Efforts on Business Markets (July
22, 2004), available at http://www.corp.att.com/news/2004/07/22-13163.
46 When confronted with the question of whether he would approve an RBOC/AT&T
merger, then-FCC Chairman Hundt stated: "a combination of AT&T and an 'RBOC' is
unthinkable." Reed Hundt, Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks at the Brookings
Institution: Thinking About Why Some Communications Mergers are Unthinkable (June
19, 1997), ( transcript available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/spreh735.html).
47 Chairman Holland of the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission noted in his
separate statement approving of the SBC and AT&T merger that he was "encouraged that
the merged entity we approve today will become a viable competitor in Pennsylvania's
growing competitive telecommunications landscape." In re Joint Application of SBC
Commc'ns, Inc. & AT&T Corp. Together with its Certificated Pennsylvania Subsidiaries
for Approval of Merger, Opinion and Order, Docket No. A-311163F0006, Docket No. A-
310213F0008, Docket No. A-310258F0005 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n Oct. 6, 2005) (state-
ment of Chairman Wendell Holland).
48 SBC, from SouthWestern Bell Co., was never well known; it was and is still associ-
ated by some with the Southern Baptist Convention. See, e.g., Google,
http://www.google.com (search for "SBC") (last visited Feb. 22, 2007) (returning the
Southern Baptist Convention Web site near the top of the results list). It is unsurprising,
therefore, that the AT&T name survived. See Press Release, AT&T-News Room, SBC
Communications to Adopt AT&T Name (Oct. 27, 2005), available at
http://www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=4800&cdvn=news&articleid=21850.
9 Press Release, AT&T-News Room, AT&T and BellSouth Join to Create a Premier
Global Communications Company (Dec. 29, 2006), available at
httA://www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=48008&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=22860.so Preamble, Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
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one of "extraordinary complexity."'" Over the years, the FCC struggled
mightily to achieve these three goals. Unfortunately, it was hampered by
daunting and disruptive changes in technology, a change in federal admini-
strations and chairmen, 52 constant litigation and a string of judicial rever-
sals,53 as well as unexpected economic events. 4
At first, FCC policy favored non-facilities based competition through
unbundled network element ("UNE") requirements. Under Chairman Reed
Hundt, the Commission decided that a broad range of network elements
should be available to CLECs on an unbundled basis pursuant to Sections
251 and 252 of the 1996 Act.55 Deeming the competing companies "im-
paired" without UNEs, it was concluded that they could not compete effec-
tively without access to UNEs at reasonable rates.16 The Commission de-
cided the reasonable rate at which UNEs were to be made available to
competitors was the total element long-run incremental cost ("TELRIC")
rate. 7 A menu of UNEs, called the unbundled network element platform
("UNE-P"), was also created.58 From a technical standpoint, UNE-P al-
lowed CLECs greater flexibility than UNEs alone, but the real driving
force behind their creation was cost: the TELRIC pricing standard was a
money loser for the Bell companies and ILECs.59
The UNE rules encouraged a number of CLECs to enter these vast mar-
kets; billions of dollars of investment followed.6 ° Wall Street was fixated
on providing scores of billions of dollars to fund CLECs. Unfortunately,
many venture capitalists forced the CLECs to focus on immediate cus-
tomer acquisition and network building, to the detriment of the bottom
line.6 The specification of what constitutes a cost is not always obvious,
51 U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, (USTA 1), 290 F.3d 415,421 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
52 Since the passage of the 1996 Act, the FCC has had four Chairmen: two Democrats
(Hundt and Kennard), and two Republicans (Powell and Martin). See FCC, Commissioners
from 1934 to Present, http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/commish-list.html (last visited
Apr. 15, 2007).
3 See, e.g,. U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC (USTA 11), 359 F.3d 554, 594 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
cert. denied, 125 U.S. 313 (2004); Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 475
(2002); USTA I, 290 F.3d at 417; AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 370-71,
376-77, 379 (1999).
54 See Jim Chen, The Legal Process and Political Economy of Telecommunications
Reform, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 835, 835, 871-72 (1997).
55 See Local Competition Order, supra note 39, 24-27.
56 See TRO Remand Order, supra note 9, T 475.
" See id. 12, 14. The Supreme Court later upheld the FCC's rules in Verizon
Commc 'ns, 535 U.S. at 475.
58 The UNE-P is a combination of an unbundled loop, unbundled local circuit switch-
ing% and shared transport. TRO Remand Order, supra note 9. 41 n. 130.
See McDERMorr III, supra note 39, at 179-80.
60 See Shannon M. Heim, Signaling System Seven: A Case Study in Local Telephone
Competition, 13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 51, 51-53, 66-67 (2004).
61 See MCDERMoTr III, supra note 39, at 6.
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and the allocation of costs is inherently arbitrary and illusory.6" Cost being
enigmatic, CLEC revenue deficiencies greatly exacerbated disagreement
between the RBOCs and CLECs on pricing and interconnection terms.
This disagreement led to lengthy and expensive litigation on almost every
aspect of this pricing.63 Ultimately, CLECs had difficulty reaching their
customers on what they deemed an economically feasible basis. 6 Finally
and inevitably, in early 2000 the bubble began to burst.65 From that point
on there has been little or no financing available for CLECs, and many
bankruptcies and bargain-sale acquisitions have followed.66
During the same period, RBOCs successfully entered the long distance
market, methodically meeting 1996 Act guidelines.67 Simultaneously,
RBOCs challenged the TELRIC basis upon which the UNE pricing struc-
ture relied. UNE TELRIC rates were so low, the RBOCs argued, that if
required to make broadband networks available to CLECs at TELRIC
rates, new broadband build-out would be economically unfeasible for the
RBOCs themselves.68
RBOCs and CLECs went to battle almost immediately after the Act was
signed. Their legal and political battles, as well as those as for public opin-
ion, were ferocious and costly. Incumbents and competitors alike spent
millions of dollars on advertising and lobbying for their respective
causes. 6 9 Pro-CLEC groups funded CLEC lobbying efforts in Washington
to both Congress and the FCC.7" Advertisements had the dual purpose of
swinging public opinion and gaining political support. In the author's rec-
ollection, at least one CLEC advertisement found its mark-it focused on
national CLEC job losses, and purportedly raised concern at the White
House.71 The RBOCs undertook similar activities individually and jointly
62 See, e.g., Sutapa Ghosh, Comment, The Future of FCC Dominant Carrier Rate Regu-
lation: The Price Caps Scheme, 41 FED. COMM. L.J. 401, 407-08 (1989) (explaining that
the FCC's calculation of rate regulation and costs is arbitrary and subject to error and abuse
by the FCC and carriers).
63 See MCDERMoTr III, supra note 39, at 7.
64 See id. at 12-13.
65 See id. at 5-11; see also STIGLITZ, supra note 3, at 91-101.
66 MCDERMOTrr III, supra note 39, at 9.
67 Id. at 12-13.
68 See, e.g., Randolph J. May, et al., supra note 23, at 9-10.
69 See, e.g., Phone Monopolists, Again, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2002, at B 16. CompTel and
Voices for Choices (a pro-CLEC group), along with AT&T and MCI, spent millions of
dollars on local and national print and media advertising in support of their respective
causes. ld.
70 id.
71 For a brief discussion of the loss of jobs in the telecommunications industry during
the relevant time period, see G. Mitchell Wilk & Carl R. Danner, The Urgent Need for
Reform of Wholesale Telecommunications Regulation in California (Econ. Policy Inst.
Issue Brief # 199 1-2, Sept. 12, 2004), available at
http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/issuebrief199; Ed Gubbins, Jobs Grow, But Telecom Gets
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through their national and regional trade associations. 72 Not to be outdone,
the RBOC/ILEC trade association, United States Telecom Association
("USTA"), placed a gigantic billboard supporting its anti-CLEC position in
front of the US Airways departure gate at Reagan National Airport-a
location where it was sure to be seen by many Washington policymakers.
This was just part of their well-funded campaign against competitors and
CLECs; developing newspaper opinion pieces and studies bashing the
competitors became a cottage industry. Both sides also made significant
political contributions.73
Both sides and their advocacy positions seemed to shift with the winds.
At first, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
("NARUC"), a trade association dedicated to promoting the interests of
state and local public utilities commissions and the public they serve,74
supported the RBOCs in their attack on TELRIC, while the CLECs sup-
ported the FCC.75 Later, NARUC supported the CLECs in the UNE-P bat-
tle while the FCC ultimately supported the RBOCs.
7 6
Left Behind, TELEPHONY ONLINE, May 17, 2004,
http://telephonyonline.com/finance/print/telecom jobsgrow-telecom/index.html.
2 See A Contest of Connections, Millions Spent to Influence Bill on High-Speed Inter-
net Access, WASH. POST, Feb 27, 2002 ("[AT&T and SBC] poured money into hiring lob-
byists and funding candidates' campaigns [in early 2001].") [hereinafter Contest of Connec-
tions].
73 See Joshua E. Barbach, RBOCs are Spending Money: Find Out Where, PIPELINE,
Aug. 2004, http://www.pipelinepub.com/0804/newsreviewl.pdf, see also, Contest of Con-
nections, supra note 72 (putting the money spent by some RBOCs and CLECs on advertis-
ing and lobbying at $7.4 billion for the first half of 2001). For more information on money
spent by lobbying firms on behalf of telecommunications clients, see Open Secrets.org,
Lobbying Database: Telephone Utilities,
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobbyists/indusclient.asp?code=B08 (last visited Mar. 30,
2007). For money donated to campaigns by telecommunications firms, see Open Se-
crets.org, Telephone Utilities: Top Contributors to Federal Candidates and Parties,
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/contrib.asp?Ind=B08 (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
74 Among NARUC's objectives is "the promotion of coordinated action by the commis-
sions of the several States to protect the common interests of the people with respect to the
regulation of public utilities and carriers, and the promotion of cooperation of the commis-
sions of the several States with each other and with [federal agencies]." Nat'l Ass'n of
Regulatory Util. Comm'rs, NARUC Constitution (as amended Nov. 13, 2006),
http://www.naruc.org/ (select "About NARUC": then click on "NARUC Constitution" from
the menu that appears on the right).
75 See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997).
76 See Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs, NARUC Sends Letter to
Congress Clarifying the Facts over UNE-P and TELRIC,
http://www.naruc.org/displayindustryarticle.cfm?articlenbr = 15716; Donny Jackson, FCC
Removes Section 271 Concerns from RBOC Fiber Plans, TELEPHONY ONLINE, Oct. 25,
2004, http://telephonyonline.com/news/web/telecom-fcc-removessection/; Donny Jack-
son, RBOC Legal Win Could Be Hollow Victory, TELEPHONY ONLINE, June 21, 2004,
http://telephonyonline.com/regulatory/print/telecomrboc-legal-win/; Promoting Local
Competition: A Means to Greater Broadband Deployment, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Trans., 107th Cong. 2-8 (2002) (statement of Hon. Robert B.
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Moreover, neither side was completely unified. Unfortunately, serious
divisions arose much too often on the CLEC side between the smaller fa-
cilities-based CLECs represented by the Association of Local Telecommu-
nications Service Providers ("ALTS") and the UNE-P and larger facilities-
based service providers represented by CompTel. 7 Rumors of similar dis-
putes among the RBOCs were rampant as well. By the end of 2003, it
seemed most of the major Washington lobbying firms were engaged on
behalf of one side or another. The battleground spread from the FCC, to
the states, to Congress and, ultimately, to the White House. There were
constant meetings and Administration involvement. Both sides had their
representatives and partisans active in each skirmish.
Although the CLECs did win the TELRIC and legislative fights, ulti-
mately the RBOCs triumphed in the more important Triennial Review bat-
tle before the Powell Commission.78 The RBOCs also prevailed in various
decisions of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals,79 and no appeal was taken
from those decisions. As a result, RBOC's mass market switching service
was lost to CLECs and UNE-P has been phased out.80 Similarly, CLECs'
access to high capacity loops and transport has become severely re-
stricted.8 ' AT&T and MCI chose to find merger mates rather than continue
to suffer the slow torture of atrophic economic decline.82 Some CLECs
Nelson, Comm'r, Michigan Public Service Comm'n and Co-Vice Chairman of Telecomm.
Comm. of NARUC). See also In re Petition for Forbearance From the Current Pricing Rules
for the Unbundled Network Element Platform, WC Docket No, 93-157, Comments of the
Nat'l Ass'n of State Util. Consumer Advocates 7-8 (filed Aug. 18, 2003) (accessible via
FCC Electronic Comment Filing System).
77 Authors' personal knowledge. Articles and reports discuss some of the issues upon
which disagreement arose. See A Contest of Connections, supra note 72. See also TELECOM
POLICY REPORT, IXCS GET A BREAK IN CLEC ACCESS CHARGE PROCEEDING (2004),
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PJR/is_20_2/ain6035044; Bells Making More than
$600 Million on LNE-P, CompTel Study Shows, P.R. NEWSWIRE, May 22, 2003, available
at http://www.isg-telecom.com/bells makingmore than.htm. Moreover, with neither side
content, the war between local competitors and RBOCs continued. See, e.g., David Rhode,
The Fight for Fiber and Copper, NETWORK WORLD, Dec. 25, 2000,
http,://www.networkworld.com/power2000/power-strsbc/power-strsbc.html.
8 See TRO Remand Order, supra note 9, 1 36 n. 110.
79 See, e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC (USTA I1), 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 125 U.S. 313 (2004); U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC (USTA 1), 290 F.3d 415 (D.C.
Cir. 2002).
80 Sean Buckley, UNE-P to UNE-L: The New Battleground, TELECOM. MAG. (Feb.
2005), available at http://www.telecommagazine.com/Americas/article.asp?HHID
=AR 462.
81 See Triennial Review Remand Order, supra note 15, 43-44.
82 See SBC Commc'ns Inc. and AT&T Commc'ns Inc., Description of the Transaction,
Public Interest Showing, and Related Demonstrations, Feb. 21, 2005, at ii, available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native or_pdf=pdf&iddocument=-651730
9094 (indicating their decision to merge is based in part upon their "each endur[ing] dra-
matic declines in market capital"); Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. and MCI, Inc., Public Interest
Statement 13-15, Mar. 11, 2005, available at
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turned to VoIP-related strategies to replace UNE-P as a means to stay in
the residential and SMB markets.83 Just as CLECs' ability to compete over
the incumbents' facilities waned, the other shoe dropped. As explained
immediately below, the Supreme Court's Brand X"4 decision and the
FCC's Wireline Broadband Order5 may well be the final death knell for
intramodal competition.
B. The Twenty-First Century Debate Begins
The Twenty-First Century Debate begins with the Brand X decision,
where the Court affirmed the FCC's classification of cable broadband
Internet access as an "information service" rather than a "telecommunica-
tions service."86 By classifying cable broadband as an information service,
the FCC exempted cable broadband providers from the panoply of regula-
tions and policies under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended. This is significant from both a competitive and financial per-
spective: telecommunications services subject to Title II are treated as
"common carrier" services, and thus are subject to guidelines that affect
pricing, interconnection with competing providers, and require mandatory
contribution to the federal universal service fund, among other obliga-
tions.88
In upholding the FCC's classification, the Supreme Court validated the
FCC's broader efforts to deregulate broadband access. The Court approv-
ingly cited the Commission's logic in finding that it was ultimately "un-
wise to subject enhanced service[s] to common carrier regulation given the
'fast-moving, competitive market' in which they were offered. 89 The
Court then indicated that this reasoning was sufficient to support the FCC's
classification of cable broadband as an information service, despite the
potential inconsistency with previous FCC rulings regarding Digital Sub-
scriber Line ("DSL") service as a telecommunications service. 90
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&id-document=-65174952
15 (indicating the need for cost savings and synergies in order to compete effectively in
their market).
83 See, e.g., Covad Hopes EarthLink Just First ISP to Spend Millions on VoIP Network
Gear, 6 WASH. INTERNET DAILY 116 (Jun. 16, 2005).
84 Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs. (BrandX), 545 U.S. 967
(2005).
85 Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 9.
86 BrandX, 545 U.S. at 987.
87 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-276 (2000).
88 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-209, 25 1(a) (1), and 254(d).
89 See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 977 (quoting In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations, Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 129
(Apr. 7, 1980)).
See id. at 1001.
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The Brand X Court specifically noted that "the Commission is free
within the limits of reasoned interpretation to change course,"9 1 and that
[a]ny inconsistency between the [cable modem] order under review and the Commis-
sion's treatment of DSL service can be adequately addressed when the Commission
fully reconsiders its treatment of DSL service and when it decides whether, pursuant to
its ancillary Title I jurisdiction, to require cable companies to allow independent ISPs
access to their facilities.
92
Less than two months later, the FCC followed the Court's dictum, adopt-
ing its Wireline Broadband Order, a Report and Order and Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking that extended the Brand X ruling.93 The Wireline
Broadband Order ended what the Commission saw as "regulatory inequi-
ties" between facilities-based wireline broadband providers, placed Title II
wireline broadband providers and cable broadband providers on an equally
deregulated playing field, and established a new minimal "framework for
broadband Internet access services offered [to others] by wireline facilities-
based providers."94
The FCC thus rejected the twenty year-old Computer Inquiry 1195 regula-
tory scheme that separated the transmission component of wireline broad-
band from the service itself. Under Computer Inquiry 11, the transmission
component of information services over wireline broadband remained sub-
ject to regulation under Title II, while the information service itself was
subject only to ancillary regulation under Title 1.96 In the Wireline Broad-
band Order, the FCC found that the "information service" versus "tele-
communications service" distinction no longer adequately described
91 Id.
92 Id. at 1001-02.
93 See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 9.
94 See id. See also id. at 14,975 (statement of Chairman Kevin J. Martin). The regula-
tory inequities addressed by the Wireline Broadband Order arise out of a 2002 FCC deci-
sion classifying Internet over cable as an information service and not a telecommunications
service, thus leaving non-cable facilities based wireline broadband providers at a regulatory
disadvantage when compared to those providing broadband over cable. See In re Inquiry
Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities; Internet
Over Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access
to the Internet Over Cable Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (Mar. 14, 2002).
95 According to Vint Cerf, one of the "fathers of the Internet," the FCC's Computer
Inquiry decisions "contributed strongly towards the commercial introduction, rise, and
incredible success of the Internet." Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward: Formu-
lating a New Communications Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers
Model, 56 FED. COMM. L. J. 587, 599 (2004) (quoting Vint Cerf). See also Robert Cannon,
The Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission's Computer Inquiries, 55 FED.
COMM. L.J. 167, 169 (2003) ("[The] Computer Inquiries have been referred to by some as
'wildly successful."'). Both authors worked on the Computer Inquiry 11 decision while at
the FCC.
96 See generally Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 9, 21-31 (summarizing the
regulatory regime put in place by the now outdated Computer Inquiry decisions).
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broadband Internet access in today's environment. According to the FCC,
DSL broadband service inextricably combines computer processing, in-
formation provision and computer interactivity with telecommunications,
allowing users to run a variety of applications-from email and Web pages
to news groups-without regard for the underlying method of transmis-
sion; end users simply receive an integrated finished product.97 Identifying
this combined final product as the most important factor, the Commission
determined that there was no reason to classify wireline broadband Internet
access services differently based on the owner of the underlying transmis-
sion facilities.98
One implication of the ruling is that wireline broadband providers are no
longer required to separate the underlying transmission component from
DSL broadband service and offer it on a common carrier basis. The Wire-
line Broadband Order allows facilities-based wireline providers to choose
whether to offer broadband Internet access on a common carrier (Title II-
regulated) or non-common carrier basis.99 The FCC seemingly incorpo-
rated this flexibility to account for the differing business issues affecting
different wireline providers (i.e., rural LECs versus RBOCs). Providers
who choose to offer Internet access service on a common carrier basis sub-
ject to Title II regulation may now do so, on a permissive detariffing ba-
sis.
l °°
Recognizing that unaffiliated Internet service providers ("ISPs") rely on
the availability of then-tariffed wireline broadband Internet access, the
FCC adopted a one-year transition period to allow sufficient time for ad-
justment.1"' During this one-year period, existing transmission arrange-
ments were to be honored on a grandfathered basis, but there was no re-
quirement that new arrangements be made or that existing arrangements be
renewed. '02
Likewise, the FCC held that UNEs must remain available to CLECs un-
der Section 251 so long as a CLEC is offering an "eligible" service.' °3 This
holding was essential if CLECs were to have any hope of providing com-
petitive VolP service. However, that decision is subject to a pre-existing
further appeal of the Triennial Review Remand Order.'o4




101 See id. 5-7.
102 Id. This will most likely result in a reduction in the bargaining power of non-facilities
based resellers of broadband services; they must now negotiate commercial agreements for
access to cable and wireline broadband services.
103 Id. 127.
104 See Ted Gotsch, Georgia Appeals Court Affirms Ruling in BellSouth UNE Case, TR




Finally, recognizing that wireline broadband service will no longer be
subject to traditional regulation, the FCC seeks to develop a framework
that ensures that consumer protection needs are met by all providers of
broadband Internet access service, regardless of the underlying technology.
Therefore, in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the FCC asked whether, in
order to address consumer issues, it should impose regulations under its
ancillary jurisdiction that are similar to existing Title II regulations in the
areas of consumer proprietary network information, slamming, truth-in-
billing, network outage reporting, section 214 discontinuance, section
254(g) rate averaging, federal and state involvement, and consumer en-
forcement. 0 5 This represents a complete reversal in approach from where
the FCC started in 1996.
The FCC followed up its Wireline Broadband Order with similar orders
holding that broadband over power line-enabled Internet access service
and wireless broadband internet access service were also information ser-
vices. 106 At the same time, the Commission continues to refuse to address
the issue of "whether VoIP should be classified as a telecommunications
service or an information service."' 7
Clearly, the FCC is troubled by uncertainty as to the scope of its authority.
C. Post-1996 Changes in Competition and Technology
Change has not been limited to regulatory policy. Indeed, technology and
market forces have been the drivers of the regulatory process." 8 Contrary
to the expectations of CLECs and spurred by technological innovations,
the wireline industry experienced a rapid and intense increase in intermo-
dal competition, as cable, VoIP, and wireless companies have aggressively
moved into traditional wireline voice markets. Industry boundaries have
blurred as these competitors, along with Internet companies, energy com-
105 See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 9, 146-59.
106 See In re Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet
Over Wireless Networks, Declaratory Ruling, FCC 07-30; WT Docket No. 07-53 (Mar. 22,
2007) (declaring wireless broadband an information service); In re United Power Line
Council's Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding the Classification of Broadband over
Power Line Internet Access Service as an Information Service, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13,281 (Nov. 3, 2006) (declaring broadband over power lines an infor-
mation service).
107 In re Time Warner Cable Request for Declaratory Ruling that Competitive Local
Exchange Carriers May Obtain Interconnection Under Section 251 of the Communications
Act of 1934, as Amended, to Provide Wholesale Telecommunications Services to VolP
Providers, Memorandum Opinion and Order, DA 07-709; WC Docket No. 06-55, 15 n.41
(Mar. 1, 2007).
108 See, e.g., Written Statement of The Hon. Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n Before the Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Trans., U.S. Senate (Sept. 12, 2006)
("[I]n this fast paced technological environment, regulations struggle to keep up").
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panies, and ISPs, offer, or have the capacity to offer, core telecommunica-
tions services. 09
ILECs now face a market in which data traffic on the network predomi-
nates over voice traffic,"' many customers have abandoned their landlines
for wireless services,"' and a massive shift of long distance traffic from
switched wireline to VoP has occurred."2 Businesses and consumers have
benefited as they now receive and use telecommunications services in
ways that were unimaginable just a few years ago. Seventy-seven percent
of all adults in the United States now have access to the Intemet-an in-
crease from nine percent in 1995. 113 This increase has occurred not only
among the young and the affluent, but among low-income and older users
as well." 4 To the chagrin of the LECs, many college students and young
adults have completely abandoned wireline phones and instead rely on
cable modems and wireless phones to meet their needs." 5 Sophisticated
enterprise customers seeking to drive down their telecommunications costs
now rely on consultants, equipment manufacturers, or systems integrators,
as opposed to traditional wireline carriers, to source their communications
services." 6 And, with the rapid growth of VoIP, which "is finally ready for
109 See, e.g., VoIP Drastically Changing Telecom Landscape, NEW TELEPHONY, May 9,
2005 at 8, available at http://www.nxtbook.com/fx/books/virgo/newtelephony-May09-05/.
See also Ind. Analysis & Tech. Div., Wireline Comp. Bureau, High Speed Services for
Internet Access: Status as of December 31, 2004, 2-3 (2005) available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common Carrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/IAD/hspdO7O5.pdf
0 See Thomas W. Hazlett, Rivalrous Telecommunications Networks With and Without
Mandatory Sharing, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 477, 478-80 (2006); Jared S. Dinkes, Rethinking
the Revolution: Competitive Telephony in a Voice over Internet Protocol Era, 66 OHIO ST.
L.J. 833, 858-61 (2005).
"'1 See, e.g., Brian Falk, Wireless Phones Chip Away at Dominance of Landlines,
CHARLOTTE Bus. J., Oct. 25, 2002, available at
http://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/stories/2002/l0/28/focus3.html.
12 Frost & Sullivan, a global research, consulting and analysis firm asserted in 2005 that
VoIP is "expected to emerge as a strong contender for traditional circuit-switched telephony
services," and predicted that 30% of long distance traffic will move "from switched wire-
line to VoIP by 2011." See VoIP Drastically Changing Telecom Landscape, supra note 109.
113 Antone Gonsalves, Number of Online Americans Continues to Grow, TECH WEB
TECHNOLOGY NEWS, May 25, 2006, http://www.techweb.com/wire/ebiz/1 88500373.
114 Id.
115 See, e.g., Paige McGregor, College Life and the Cell Phone Phenomenon,
ASSOCIATED CONTENT, Feb. 9, 2007,
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/I 39927/college life and the cellphonepheno
menon.html.
116 See, e.g., Roger Morton, Wireless in the Warehouse, LOGISTICS TODAY, May 2006, at




prime time,""l. 7 the threat to the wireline companies' "plain old telephone
service" is greater each day.
Each of these competitive threats to the legacy wireline industry is both
significant and unique. For example, the actual size of the threat facing the
RBOCs in the wireless arena is unclear because AT&T, BellSouth, and
Verizon have developed a major presence in wireless through their respec-
tive control of Cingular and Verizon Wireless."' The competitive danger
that they face, however, is real. For the first time, there are more wireless
than wireline subscriptions in the United States 9 and it is estimated that
LECs could lose forty percent of their landline customers over the next ten
years. 20 Moreover, the strength of other wireless carriers cannot be under-
estimated. The Sprint Nextel combination has enabled that company to
become an even more formidable competitor, thereby allowing it to pro-
vide wireless retail and resale customers with significant competitive alter-
natives.' Cable companies and Mobile Virtual Network Operators are
already taking advantage of the Sprint Nextel network. 2 In addition, com-
petitive wireless broadband service, based on technology perfected in Asia
and Europe, is coming to the United States. 23
After having "invested almost $100 billion since 1996 to replace coaxial
cable with fiber optic technology and installing new digital equipment in
homes and system headends,"' 24 cable company voice telephony, which
languished for many years, is quickly gaining ground as a result of VoIP.
According to the FCC, "[t]here is... significant evidence in the record indi-
cating that mass market subscription to cable-based VoIP continues to in-
crease nationwide as cable operators continue to roll out these services
throughout their footprints.' 25
117 See BERNSTErN RESEARCH, VOICE OVER IP: RIPPLE OR TIDAL WAVE? 9 (2004); see
also John Walko, Huge Growth Seen in Retail VoIP, INFO. WK., July 6, 2005, available at
http://informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD= 165700249.
8 See Eleventh Annual CMRS Competition Report, supra note 27, 25.
119 In the United States, there were 181.1 million wireless subscriptions in December
2004, compared with 177.9 million ILEC and CLEC subscriptions. BNA DAILY REPORT
FOR EXECS., 131 MORE WIRELESS PHONES THAN LANDLINES FOR FIRST TIME A-12 (July 11,
2005).
120 Rewired and Ready For Combat, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 7, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_45/b3958089.htm.
121 See Jon Van, Sprint Nextel Partners with Comcast, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 2005.
122 Sprint Nextel, Comcast, Cox Communications, and other cable companies have
joined together to develop new offerings described as a "Quadruple Play." The offering will
include video, wireless voice and data service, high-speed Internet, and cable phone service.
See id.
123 See Rob Kelley, Broadband Lag Could Hurt the U.S., CNN MONEY.COM, June 17,
2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/06/16/technology/broadband/index.htm.
124 Twelfth Annual Cable Report, supra note 29, 10.
125 AT&T/SBC Merger Order, supra note 13, 87.
[Vol. 15
First Great Telecom Debate
Technology now permits competitive services to be offered from the
edge of the network by non-facilities based providers. 126 This has become
known as "BYOB" or "bring your own broadband." BYOB has permitted
VoP providers, such as Vonage, to offer competitive broadband ser-
vices. 127 Many former UNE-P carriers view VolP as their salvation and are
preparing to offer VoP service, if they have not already done so.' 28 Vari-
ous wholesale companies are structuring products designed to assist
CLECs in converting from UNE-P to VoIP based services. 1
29
Internet companies and ISPs have also entered the fray. Google recently
agreed to purchase a five percent stake in AOL for $1 billion, and Yahoo
has entered into deals with RBOCs. 130 Earthlink has been chosen to provide
high-speed wireless Internet access across Philadelphia.13 1 These compa-
nies have the ability to offer suites of communications functionalities in-
cluding VoIP, instant messaging, and video, impacting not only the
RBOCs and cable providers, but also VoIP providers like Vonage.
132
Even power companies have started to enter traditional wireline markets
through the provision of Broadband over Power Line ("BPL"). 13 3 A final
aspect of this new reality is that even offerings that were once considered
to be local or regional in nature, such as answering and monitoring ser-
vices, have become international in scope as technology has "flattened" the
world. 134
In response to this competitive tsunami, wireline carriers are investing
billions of dollars in competitive new broadband networks, and have begun
126 BLAIR LEVIN ET AL., NET NEUTRALITY: VALUE CHAIN TUG OF WAR (Stiffel, Nicolaus
& Co., Inc., 2006), available at http://www.democraticmedia.org/PDFs/NNTugofwar.pdf.
127 See Vonage Order, supra note 34, 5.
128 See Buckley, supra note 80.
129 In re Applications of SBC Communications, Inc. and AT&T Corporation For Con-
sent To Transfer Control of Section 214 and 308 Licenses and Authorizations and Cable
Landing License, WC Docket No. 05-65, CompTel/ALTS Petition to Deny at 19 (filed Apr.
25, 2005) available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&id-document=65175849
18.
130 Google Outflanks Microsoft with AOL Deal, TODAY ONLINE, Dec. 22, 2005,
http://www.todayonline.com/articles/91502.asp; see also Michael Liedtke, Yahoo, Bell-
South Team Up to Sell High-Speed Internet Access, USA TODAY, Oct. 17, 2005, available
at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/business/2005- 10-17-yahoo-
bell x.htm?csp=34.
lfT See Assoc. Press, Philly Picks EarthLink for Wi-Fi, Oct. 14, 2005,
http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section = tech&id=3497192.
132 See Legg Mason, Yahoo-Microsoft Interoperability Agreement and the Rise of the
P2PC (Oct. 12, 2005).
133 See In re Amendment of Part 15 regarding new requirements and measurement
guidelines for Access Broadband over Power Line Systems; Carrier Current Systems, in-
cluding Broadband over Power Line Systems, Report and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 21,265 (Oct.
14, 2004).
134 See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 48 (2005).
20071
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
to offer their own versions of VolP and broadband video.'35 These high-
speed offerings include voice, video, data, and Internet access, and may
ultimately be bundled with wireless services.'36
As a consequence, not only are LECs facing more intramodal competi-
tion, but also many value-creating opportunities have shifted from within
the network to its edge.'37 The ability of the LECs to maintain a strong
competitive position in the face of these developments-particularly com-
petition from operators of more than one cable system, or Multiple System
Operators ("MSOs")--is uncertain. Even having made significant invest-
ments, wireline companies still face growing competition, technological
innovation, and other market forces that will continue to pressure them to
react by changing their rate structure such that voice becomes a "give-
away," minutes of use and network capacity are treated as a commodity,
and wireline prices and profits are lowered accordingly. 38 These are the
same types of pressures that wreaked havoc in the long distance market,
and led to the demise of long distance carriers.
139
D. What's Next?
Given that most of the predictions made in 1996 were misdirected and
inaccurate,"4 it is very difficult to forecast with any certainty what the fu-
135 Lome Manly & Ken Belson, Calling Out The Cable Guy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2005,
at 1. It is estimated that Verizon will spend $22 billion and that AT&T will spend $7 billion
through 2010 on these networks. ld
136 SBC Plans IPTV for Businesses, LIGHT READING, Oct. 19, 2005,
http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=82634&print=true; see also IPTV
Projects on All Things Supercomm, EXCHANGE MAG., July 1, 2005,
http://www.xchangemag.com/articles/571supercomml .html?wts=20060221094310&hc=97
&req=iPTV+and+Projects+and+on+and+All+and+Things+and+Supercomm.
13 See Levin et al., supra note 126, at 5.
138 Jeff Bertloucci, Save a Bundle on Telecom Services, KIPLINGER'S PERSONAL FINANCE,
Feb. 2007, available at http://www.kiplinger.com/magazine/archives/2007/02/cable.html
(discussing the savings achieved by customers when telephone and cable companies pro-
vide more than one service under the same bill); Investors Hang Up on Cincinnati Bell,
Bus. WK., Feb. 20, 2007,
http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/feb2007/pi2OO70220_799626.htm?campaig
n-id=rssnull (demonstrating that despite the practice of bundling and lowering consumer
prices, providers are still struggling to meet earnings expectations).
139 See Company News; Long-Distance Rate Drop Seen, NYTIMES.COM, Oct. 25, 1986,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9AODE3D91F3FF936AI 5753C1A9609482
60 (discussing the reduction in long distance calling rates across the market); Chris
Bucholtz, Lowered Prices, Raised Fists: AT&T, MCI Drop Rates, But Local Companies
Still Claim Foul Play, TELEPHONY ONLINE, July 7, 1997,
http://telephonyonline.com/mag/telecom-lowered_prices-raised/ (discussing rate reduc-
tions). See also supra Part II.A.
140 Kelly M. Teal, 1996 Telecom Act Turns 10: Reflections on the Old, Predictions on
the New, NEW TELEPHONY, Feb. 8, 2006,
http://www.newtelephony.com/news/62h8l0492.html.
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ture holds for the telecommunications industry. Clearly, the regulatory and
technological trends outlined herein will continue. Industry consolidation
will also continue because it represents an appropriate response to the
regulatory, competitive, and technological developments outlined above
that have forced companies to choose between being relegated to becoming
niche players and being truly global participants. This consolidation will
take place both at the retail and wholesale carrier level. Likewise, competi-
tion and new entry will grow as non-traditional players such as Google,
Yahoo, and Earthlink play a larger role. A broad array of new and existing
entities have available the technology to offer consumers broad service
choices and all on a single bill.
These are not the only changes to be expected. The FCC's approvals of
the AT&T/SBC, 41 Verizon/MCI, 42 and Sprint/Nextel 43 mergers, and its
Wireline Broadband Order and NPRM, and the orders and court decisions
which predated them,1" represent the final shift from regulatory support
for intramodal competition to complete reliance on intermodal competition
at a time when industry consolidation is accelerating and the distinctions
among wireline, wireless, and cable services are blurring. According to
Legg Mason, "[t]he paradigm envisioned by the 1996 Telecommunications
Act is in its ninth inning and a new game is about to begin in earnest."'
45
This sweeping policy change will be felt not only across the telecommu-
nications industry, but also on Capitol Hill and in the states. Retail rate
deregulation may prove to be inevitable as more and more offerings are
classified as information services under Title I. Title I services are not sub-
ject to state regulation. 146 Thus, we can also anticipate seeing across-the-
board changes in the application of state and local regulation.
If we are to avoid a repeat of the ruinous UNE-type regulatory wars that
raged immediately after the 1996 Act became law, regulators and legisla-
141 In re SBC Communications, Inc. and AT&T Corp.; Applications for Approval of
Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18,290 (Oct. 31, 2005).
142 Verizon Merger Order, supra note 13.
143 See Sprint/Nextel Merger Order, supra note 13.
144 These orders and cases include: In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the
Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities; Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appro-
priate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities,
Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (Mar. 14, 2002)
[hereinafter Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling]; Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Assn' v. Brand
X Internet Servs. (BrandX), 545 U.S. 967 (2005), U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC (USTA fl),
359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 U.S. 313 (2004); and the Wireline Broad-
band Order, supra note 9, 8.
145 LEGG MASON, WASHINGTON TELECOM & MEDIA INSIDER 1 (2005).
146 Information services are "free from state-imposed economic, public utility type regu-
lation, consistent with the Commission's long-standing policy of non-regulation for infor-
mation services." Vonage Order, supra note 34, n. 118, aff'd sub nom. Minn. Pub. Util.




tors must be guided by two principles. First, regulatory parity must exist
among all multichannel video programming distributors ("MVPDs"),
147
particularly between LECs and cable companies. Second, competition must
be encouraged, both at the edge of the network and across platforms, in
order to mitigate the natural tendency of monopolies and oligopolies to
hinder innovation.
There is, however, one issue that Congress must address above all others
in order to foster the certainty that stimulates innovation and competition.
That is, what is the actual scope of the FCC's ancillary authority over Title
I information services? The FCC is quickly moving forward to abandon its
Title II regulation. 4 The uncertainty that surrounds the agency's Title I
authority has become problematic, breeding uncertainty that can lead to
stifled innovation and dampened competition. One contrary court decision
could undo much of what the FCC is seeking to achieve. The time has
come for Congress to address the scope of the FCC's Title I authority so as
to avoid the regulatory gamesmanship of the past.
In BrandX, the Supreme Court stated that "the Commission remains free
to impose special regulatory duties on facilities-based ISPs under its Title
I ancillary jurisdiction."' 4 9 Based on this conclusion, the FCC has held that
it "has [the] jurisdiction necessary to ensure that providers of telecommu-
nications for Internet access or Internet Protocol-enabled (IP-enabled) ser-
vices are operated in a neutral manner."'50
By contrast, in its Broadcast Flag decision, the D.C. Circuit noted that
the Commission was acting in deference to the Supreme Court's caution
that "the ancillary jurisdiction test... [not be used] to confer 'unbounded'
jurisdiction on the Commission," and rejected FCC rules which the court
deemed to "rest on no apparent statutory foundation and, thus, appear to be
ancillary to nothing."'' Unfortunately, the Supreme Court majority in
BrandX did not elaborate on what it meant by the term "special regulatory
147 A multichannel video programming distributor is defined as "a person.., who makes
available for purchase, by subscribers or customers, multiple channels of video program-
min." 47 U.S.C. § 522(13) (2000).
14 According to Justice Scalia, the FCC "has attempted to establish a whole new regime
of non-regulation... through an implausible reading of the statute." BrandX, 545 U.S. 967,
1005 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). If this turns out to be a policy misjudgment on the part
of the FCC, undoing the mistake can take years. See supra Part II.A.
149 Id. at 996 (emphasis added).
15o In re Appropriate Framework For Broadband Access To The Internet Over Wireline
Facilities; Review Of Regulatory Requirements For Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecom-
munications Services; Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company
Provision Of Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review Of Computer
III and ONA Safeguards and Requirements; Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access To
The Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities; Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling,
Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,986, 4 (Aug. 5, 2005).
15 Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC (Broadcast Flag), 406 F.3d 689, 702-03 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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duties" or define the scope of the Commission's ancillary authority. More-
over, as Justice Scalia noted in his dissent,
there is reason to doubt whether [the FCC] can use its Title I powers to impose com-
mon-carrier-like requirements since 47 U.S.C. § 153(44) specifically provides that a
'telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common carrier under this chapter
only to the extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications services'[], and
'this chapter' includes Titles I and 11.152
The Commission's CALEA Report and Order153 and the even more re-
cent Court of Appeals decision affirming it over a strong dissent'54 demon-
strate the problems that the FCC will face as it tries to rationalize its
broadband decisions based on current law. In response to a post-September
1 lth Department of Justice petition, the FCC held that "providers of facili-
ties-based broadband Internet access services and interconnected VoIP
services" were subject to the Communications Assistance for Law En-
forcement Act'55 even though "they are not telecommunications carriers as
defined in the Communications Act."156 Although arguably in the public
interest, the result was, at least at first glance, in conflict with FCC prece-
dent which held that these were "information services" and, as a result,
presumably not subject to CALEA by its very terms.'57 To avoid an "irrec-
oncilable tension," the Commission held that "a service classified as an
'information service' under the Communications Act may not, in all re-
spects, be classified as an 'information service' under CALEA."' 58 The
FCC reasoned that the definition of "telecommunications carrier" was
broader, or at least different, under CALEA because it covered providers,
such as broadband Internet access service providers, whose service "re-
place[d] . . . a substantial portion of the local exchange service."'5 9 The
Commission then went on to limit its ruling, determining that these provid-
ers had no CALEA obligations with respect to services such as Web-
hosting or storage; only their switching and transmission components were
subject to CALEA.1
60
152 BrandX, 545 U.S. at 1005, 1014 (emphasis added) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153 In re Commc'ns Assistance for law Enforcement and Broadband Act and Broadband
Access and Services, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
20 F.C.C.R. 14,989 (Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter CALEA Report and Order].
154 Am. Council on Educ. v. FCC (CALEA Appeal Decision), 451 F.3d 226, 228 (D.C.
Cir. 2006).
155 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), 47 U.S.C. §§
1001-1010 (2000).
156 CALEA Report and Order, supra note 153, 8-9.
117 "While CALEA's substantive provisions apply to 'telecommunications carrier[s],'
they do not apply to 'information services."' CALEA Appeal Decision, 451 F.3d at 228
(citing 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(2)(A)). See also CALEA Report ad Order, supra note 153, 7
8-9.





Although a majority of the Court of Appeals three-judge panel affirmed
the FCC's decision as a reasonable policy choice under Chevron,161 in a
well-reasoned dissent Senior Circuit Judge Edwards argued that "[i]n de-
termining that broadband Internet providers are subject to CALEA as 'tele-
communications carriers' and not excluded pursuant to the 'information
services' exemption, the Commission apparently forgot to read the words
of the statute ... Broadband Internet is an 'information service'. . . [and]
providers are exempt from the substantive provisions of CALEA."' 162 As-
serting that the FCC's reasoning was "gobbledygook," Judge Edwards
asserted that the FCC's interpretation of CALEA was at odds with the
statutory interpretation, further noting that prior to the issuance of its Or-
der, the Commission had consistently held that broadband Internet service
was an "information service."' 163 He accused the agency of "attempting to
squeeze authority from a statute that does not give it.' ' 164 If Justice Scalia
and Judge Edwards are ultimately proven to be correct, the FCC could be
left with little or no authority under Title I to address real problems.
The situation is even more complex because the FCC's decision to clas-
sify broadband Internet access services as "information services" not only
raises questions regarding the FCC's jurisdiction but also that of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission ("FTC"). Common carrier services regulated under
Title II are exempt from the FTC's jurisdiction, while information services
are not. 165 In response to a Congressional inquiry, the Chairman of the FTC
stated
[t]he FTC is the only federal agency with general jurisdiction over consumer protec-
tion and competition in most sectors of the economy, including broadband Internet ac-
cess services. In particular, we consider the provision of cable-modem and DSL ser-
vices generally to be subject to jurisdiction. The Brand X and the Wireline Broadband
Internet Access Order support this view.
166
This jurisdictional debate must be resolved, as soon as possible, in the fa-
vor of the FCC as the expert agency if a new and even more sophisticated
round of forum-shopping and regulatory confusion is to be prevented.
VoIP brings this issue front and center. VoIP is a broadband application
that is dependent upon broadband Internet access, and its retail regulation
may prove to be neither necessary nor warranted under Title 11.167 But, as
161 CALEA Appeal Decision, 451 F.3d at 232 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 834-45 (1984)).
162 Id. at 236 (Edwards, J. dissenting).
163 Id. at 237.
164 Id.
165 Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Address Before The Progress
and Freedom Foundation's Aspen Summit (Aug. 21, 2006), at 4-6, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/060821pffaspenfinal.pdf.
66 Id. at 3.
167 The FCC found that Pulver.com's Free World Dialup service was an information
service. In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling that pulver.com's Free World Dialup Is Nei-
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indicated by the jurisdictional dispute between Minnesota and Vonage that
led to the FCC's Vonage Order,'68 the states have a strong interest in main-
taining some authority over VolP services if for no other reason than to
protect consumers.' 69 If VoP is deregulated, it will likely be difficult to
justify the continued regulation of traditional retail wireline voice; inevita-
ble deregulation may leave the voice consumer completely unprotected.
The FCC may also face this conundrum outside the realm of voice, as con-
vergence makes it technologically possible for unregulated entities to pro-
vide traditionally regulated services outside the regulatory scheme. This is
why the FCC has stubbornly refused to address this issue. There is, how-
ever, a solution to this dilemma.
VoIP and voice deregulation should not be synonymous with regulatory
abandonment. After all, as demonstrated by problems in the electricity
sector, deregulation does not always work as expected. 170 The authority
that the FCC has asserted over information services under Title I must be
affirmed by statute.' 7' The FCC must be given the statutory authority to use
Title I as a means to step in and address problems in this area as they de-
velop. The FCC's approach to regulation under Title I should be rethought
as well; otherwise the distinction between the titles will become meaning-
less. Instead of the more traditional "just and reasonable" analysis appro-
priate under Title 11,172 the Commission's actions under Title I should be
dictated by antitrust-type standards, and based on economic analysis.'73 To
ther Telecommunications Nor a Telecommunications Service, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 3307, 1 (Feb. 12, 2004). In contrast, it preempted state regulation of
Vonage's Digital Voice service but did not decide whether the offering was a telecommuni-
cations or information service. Vonage Order, supra note 34, 14.
168 The FCC found that "multiple state regulatory regimes would likely violate the
Commerce Clause because of the unavoidable effect that regulation on an intrastate compo-
nent would have on interstate use of this service or use of the service within other states."
Vonage Order, supra note 34, 14.
169 See, e.g., News Release, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, PUC Commissioner Susan P.
Kennedy: Track Blocking of Cell Phone Number Transfers, at 2 (Dec. 4, 2004) (noting that
the state PUC is "the agency primarily responsible for consumer protection" in telecommu-
nications issues) available at
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/wordjpdf/NEWS RELEASE/32162.pdf.
170 See Edan Rotenberg, Energy Efficiency in Regulated and Deregulated Markets, 24
UCLA J. ENVTL L & POL'Y 259 (2006); Peter Navarro & Michael Shames, Electricity De-
regulation: Lessons Learned from California, 24 ENERGY L.J. 33 (2003); Kirsten H. Engel,
The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental Regulation: The
Chaos of Energy Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 244 (1999).
171 See Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 9. See also James B. Speta, FCC Author-
ity to Regulate the Internet: Creating It and Limiting It, 35 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 16 (2003-
2004) (discussing how a statutory rule on Internet interconnection will resolve the problem
of Title I's inability to provide sufficient regulatory authority).
172 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000).
173 As an ancillary matter, the time has come to increase the consumer protection role of
state PUCs based on national guidelines so as to avoid the market disincentive of fifty dif-
ferent enforcement schemes. State PUCs tend to be the "first line of defense" for telecom-
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some, this proposal represents a major change in this nation's regulatory
philosophy, but it is one that is justified on the grounds of promoting com-
petition across platforms through regulatory certainty in today's techno-
logically converged environment.
III. CONCLUSION
At the beginning of this article, we noted that the telecommunications
industry has reached a historic inflection point. An inflection is defined as
a "change of curvature from convex to concave at a particular point on a
curve."' 74 The direction of the telecommunications industry has changed
and it is of little merit to debate whether this change is for good or bad-it
simply is! The question for all of us is how to move forward so as to ensure
that there is still "available, so far as possible, to all the people of the
United States, without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire
and radio communication service."' 7 5 Accomplishing this important goal in
the new and dynamic telecommunications environment entails a careful
balance of market considerations and regulatory certainty: Congress must
affirm FCC authority to regulate information services and the FCC must be
active in addressing new problems as they arise. The resultant regime will
accomplish the quadruple task of enhancing competition, protecting con-
sumers, avoiding regulatory uncertainty that paralyzed the industry in the
past, and promoting new technologies. The Twenty-First Century tele-
communications debate has been joined; it is our hope that this article con-
tributes to this important discussion.
munications consumers and it makes sense to centralize consumer protection in these agen-
cies. See Reza Dibadj, Competitive Debacle in Local Telephony: Is the 1996 Telecommuni-
cations Act to Blame?, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (2003).
174 THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 938 (2d ed. 1989).
"' 47 U.S.C. § 151.
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